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Abstract One of the fundamental problems in crowdsourcing is the trade-off
between the number of the workers needed for high-accuracy aggregation and
the budget to pay. For saving budget, it is important to ensure high quality
of the crowd-sourced labels, hence the total cost on label collection will be
reduced. Since the self-confidence of the workers often has a close relationship
with their abilities, a possible way for quality control is to request the workers
to return the labels only when they feel confident, by means of providing unsure
option to them. On the other hand, allowing workers to choose unsure option
also leads to the potential danger of budget waste. In this work, we propose
the analysis towards understanding when providing the unsure option indeed
leads to significant cost reduction, as well as how the confidence threshold is
set. We also propose an online mechanism, which is alternative for threshold
selection when the estimation of the crowd ability distribution is difficult.
Keywords Crowdsourcing · Mechanism design · Unsure option · Cost
reduction
1 Introduction
Labeled data play a crucial role in machine learning. In recent years, crowd-
sourcing has been a popular cost-saving way for label collection. The power
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of crowdsourcing relies on two conditions. One is the possibility to obtain
highly accurate estimation of true labels by aggregating the collected noisy
labels. Another is that the cost paid to the workers during the label collection
process is not large, hence crowdsourcing is much more economical than to
recruit domain experts. Particularly, in practice the budget to pay is usually
limited. So it is important to study the approaches for balancing between cost
reduction and estimation performance.
Unfortunately, there is a trade-off between aggregation accuracy and cost.
As more labels are collected, typically, the aggregated accuracy increases, while
the cost also increases. One way to deal with this problem is to design bet-
ter label aggregation methods, without controlling the data collection process
(Raykar et al, 2010; Dalvi et al, 2013; Zhang et al, 2014). Another more ac-
tive way is to design effective task assignment mechanisms, for saving budget
meanwhile maintaining the aggregation quality (Karger et al, 2011; Ho et al,
2013). However, all these methods do not utilize the subjective behavior of
the workers. Though seldom studied previously, it is interesting to consider
an alternative kind of mechanisms utilizing the subjective uncertainty of the
crowd, by allowing workers to choose unsure option instead of actually labeling
the data. The advantage is that since the confidence of the workers often has
a close relationship with their potential abilities, the quality of the returned
labels may be improved. In (Zhong et al, 2015), the setting of providing un-
sure option was studied under the active learning with crowd scenario, and
the effect of label quality improvement was empirically justified from experi-
ments. On the other hand, for ensuring the honesty of one worker, choosing
unsure option should also be paid. Otherwise the workers would prefer to make
guesses when their confidence is low. As a result, providing unsure option also
leads to the potential danger of budget waste, since under the same budget,
the number of returned labels is decreased. It is important to theoretically
answer when providing unsure option can lead to significant cost reduction.
In this work, we take the first step towards the analysis of the cost-saving
effect for the crowdsourcing with unsure option setting. Firstly, we provide the
sufficient conditions for employing unsure option to be indeed effective on cost
reduction. Secondly, we show how confidence threshold can be set properly.
Thirdly, motivated by the theoretical results, we propose an alternative online
mechanism. It is suitable to use for threshold selection when the statistics
about the crowd are difficult to estimate due to the lack of golden standard
tasks with known labels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the related work
is discussed. In section 3, we describe the basic formulations and assumptions.
Section 4 and section 5 give the theoretical analysis on the quality ensured and
the unsure mechanisms. They include the main results of this paper. Section 6
discusses the possible extensions of the incentive compatible payment schemes.
Section 7 introduces the online algorithm. Section 8 shows the experimental
results. Section 9 concludes the paper.
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2 Related Work
Crowdsourcing, typically crowd-sourced data labeling, has been a fruitful topic
in machine learning. One of the central tasks is to achieve desirable learning
performance using the noisy labels returned by the crowd. This can be done by
learning good classifiers utilising the noisy labels directly (Dekel and Shamir,
2009a,b; Urner et al, 2012). Meanwhile, in many researches the label estima-
tion problem has been thouroughly studied (Raykar et al, 2010; Zhou et al,
2012; Dalvi et al, 2013; Li and Yu, 2014; Zhang et al, 2014; Zhou et al, 2015).
The focus of these two kinds of researches is on improving learning perfor-
mance, while the label collection cost is not directly considered.
(Wang and Zhou, 2016) points out the importance of the cost-saving ef-
fect in crowdsourcing, showing that cost reduction is one of the central tasks
involved. And (Wang and Zhou, 2015) theoretically shows that it is indeed
possible to achieve desired accuracy with reasonable cost. From the algorith-
mic perspective, there are many researches about task assignment and budget
allocation, which try to balance between aggregation accuracy and data collec-
tion cost. Both non-adaptive task assignment mechanisms (Karger et al, 2011;
Tran-Thanh et al, 2013), which assign the tasks off-line before the worker
comes, and the adaptive mechanisms which assign the tasks on-line during
the labeling process (Ho et al, 2013; Chen et al, 2013; Abbasi-Yadkori et al,
2015), have been studied thoroughly. The accuracy-cost trade-off is also the
major issue discussed in this paper. The difference is that the task assign-
ment and budget allocation mechanisms focus on improving the behavior of
the task requesters, while for designing the unsure mechanisms, the target is
to improve the behavior of the workers, by utilizing their own uncertainty
about the tasks. There are also several studies on employing the bandit model
into crowdsourcing. In (Abraham et al, 2013), a special crowdsourcing prob-
lem called the bandit survey problem was considered. In (Jain et al, 2014),
the bandit model was employed to deal with the task assignment problem. In
(Zhou et al, 2014), the bandit arm identification problem was employed for
worker selection. All these works have different settings to our work.
There are not many works studying the unsure mechanisms in crowdsourc-
ing. (Zhong et al, 2015) considered providing unsure option under the active
learning from crowd scenario. In their work, the purpose of allowing unsure
option was to improve worker reliability. This is similar to the purpose of em-
ploying unsure mechanism in our work. The difference is that in their work,
they empirically justified that providing unsure option to the crowd could
make labeling quality improved in active learning by experiments. While in
our work, instead of considering the active learning scenario, we consider the
more general crowdsoured labeling task. Furthermore, our focus is on the
theoretical analysis of the cost-saving effect of employing unsure option. In
(Shah and Zhou, 2015), a double or nothing incentive compatible mechanism
was proposed, to make workers behave honestly based on their confidence.
Their proposed mechanism is provable to avoid spammers from the crowd,
under the assumption that every worker wants to maximize the expected pay-
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ment. In their setting, employing unsure option is a way for ensuring high
quality of the returned labels. The potential accuracy-cost trade-off is not con-
sidered. While in our work, the main focus is on the accuracy-cost trade-off,
other than designing incentive compatible mechanisms.
3 Problem Formulation
We consider the tasks of collecting binary labels of {−1, 1}. The well-known
Dawid-Skene model (Dawid and Skene, 1979; Zhou et al, 2012; Zhang et al,
2014; Karger et al, 2011; Zhou et al, 2015; Li and Yu, 2014) under the binary
classification case is adopted. Under the D-S model, the tasks are assumed to
be homogeneous. The homogeneity means that the potential cost for different
tasks are the same. As a result, in the rest of the paper, we focus on dealing
with the cost for one single task.
We adopt the anonymous worker assumption introduced in (Karger et al,
2011) for modeling the crowd. Let θi be the ability of the ith worker, i.e.
the probability that the returned label is correct. The process of choosing
a number of anonymous workers is modeled as independent random draws
θ1, θ2, θ3 · · · ∈ [0, 1] over the crowd ability distribution θi ∼ A. Once drawn,
the worker is asked to return the label or to choose unsure option based on the
crowdsourcing mechanism applied, such as the quality ensured mechanism and
unsure mechanism introduced below, or return the label directly if no mech-
anism is applied. The accuracy of the returned label is decided by the ability
of the worker. We assume that after label collection, labels are aggregated by
majority voting, i.e., to estimate the label based on the choices of the majority.
In this paper, we assume that the mean µ of A should be larger than 1/2, i.e.
µ > 1/2.
The assumption is based on the well known result such that for majority
voting, the estimated label does not converge to the true label when µ ≤ 1/2.
From this result, if µ ≤ 1/2 then any crowdsourcing mechanism that makes
the estimated label asymptotically correct can trivially leads to cost reduction.
So we only consider the non-trivial case such that µ > 1/2. We also adopt the
following assumption:
Pr
(
θ < µ− 1/2) = 0. (1)
It states that we do not allow the workers with very low abilties which are
far from the mean to exist. This assumption tightens our analysis. Indeed,
these workers may correspond to the malicious workers who aim at attacking
the crowdsourcing system, and should be excluded by any effective crodsourc-
ing mechanism. Since malicious attacks prevention beyonds the scope of this
paper, we just leave this as a preset assumption. Besides the above assump-
tions, we do not assume the crowd ability distribution A to be any specific
distributions.
We define the confidence of the workers to be the subjective accuracy
they believe to have, which is denoted by c1, c2, c3 · · · ∈ [1/2, 1]. The minimum
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value is 1/2 since the weakest choice in one honest worker’s mind is to make
random guess. Similar to the crowd ability distribution A, we assume that the
confidence for workers is independently drawn from the crowd confidence
distribution ci ∼ C. Obviously, there is a close relationship between one’s
ability and confidence. Thus modeling this relationship is necessary. In this
paper we adopt a two-step analysis. At first, we can consider the mechanism,
which simply filters out low quality labels based on the ability without using
the information of the confidence. By this subroutine, we can further consider
the setting of providing unsure option, by introducing reasonable assumptions
on the relationship between workers’ confidence and abilities.
As a consequence, we define a quality ensured mechanism as the fol-
lowing process: given an ability threshold T , when one worker is drawn for
labeling, the label is accepted only when the ability is above T . This mecha-
nism is ideal since it assumes that once a worker is drawn, the ability can be
also obtained. An unsure mechanism is a surrogate for the idealized mech-
anism. When an unsure mechanism is employed, a confidence threshold T is
adopted. One worker is asked to do labeling only when the confidence c ≥ T ,
otherwise he/she is asked to use the unsure option, for example, to return the
label “0” which represents the unsureness.
The budget is defined as the total cost on the label collection. For simplic-
ity of the analysis, we assume that returning one label and choosing unsure
option once are both paid for 1, i.e. the total cost equals to the total number
of workers involved in the task. We Also assume that workers behave honestly
according to their true abilities and confidence. Under the assumption that
each worker aims at maximizing their payments, the honesty can be satisfied
by adopting the incentive compatible payment mechanisms, which is discussed
in section 6.
The goal of our analysis is to answer the question that, on which kinds of
crowd ability distribution, an quality ensured mechanism or an unsure mech-
anism is provable to be effective:
Definition 1 For label aggregation being correct with high probability, de-
note m as the provable cost needed for the simple aggregation without any
mechanisms, and m′ as the provable cost needed when utilizing a quality en-
sured or an unsure mechanism. Then the utilized mechanism is effective if
m′ ≪ m.
Note that this is just a qualitative definition, and will be further quantified in
definition 2 and 3. The effectiveness is defined for verifying the significance of
cost reduction.
In crowdsourcing, it is usually not possible to estimate the ability or the
confidence of any individual worker, since the potential number of the tasks
for an individual to accomplish is usually very limited. On the opposite, the
statistical properties of the crowd ability distribution A and the crowd confi-
dence distribution C, are more practical to estimate. As a result, our analysis
focuses on utilizing some simple statistics of A and C, which are also much
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easier to estimate than to exactly model the distributions. Our target is to
derive:
(1) How to properly set the ability and the confidence threshold.
(2) On what kind of A and C, the quality ensured and the unsure mechanism
can be effective.
The following two inequalities are important for the analysis:
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding’s inequality, (Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David,
2014) lemma B.6) For independent random variables
X1, X2, . . . , Xm bounded in [a, b] with E
[
Xi
]
= µi, i = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, the fol-
lowing inequality holds:
Pr
( 1
m
m∑
i=1
µi − 1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi > ǫ
)
< exp(−2mǫ2/(b− a)2). (2)
Lemma 2 (Bernstein’s inequality, (Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David,
2014) lemma B.9) For independent random variables
X1, X2, . . . , Xm bounded in [−M,M ] with E
[
Xi
]
= 0, i = {1, 2, . . . ,m}
and variance σ21 , σ
2
2 , . . . , σ
2
m, the following inequality holds:
Pr
( m∑
i=1
Xi > ǫ
)
< exp(− ǫ
2/2
m∑
i=1
σ2i +Mǫ/3
). (3)
4 Analysis on the Quality Ensured Mechanisms
In this section, we focus on studying the quality ensured mechanisms. The
analysis in this section forms the foundation to the analysis of the unsure
mechanism in section 5.
To show that a quality ensured mechanism is effective, it is necessary to
compare between the cost bounds with and without the mechanism. The first
result is on the cost needed for using simple aggregation without any mecha-
nisms:
Lemma 3 Let µ denote the mean of crowd ability distribution A, for sim-
ple majority voting aggregation under the settings introduced in section 3, the
aggregated label is correct with probability at least 1 − δ if the total cost m
satisfies
m ≥ 2[1 +
2
3 (2µ− 1)] log 1δ
(2µ− 1)2 . (4)
Proof Given labels a1, a2, . . . , am, ai ∈ {−1, 1} from workers, the majority
voting rule is:
yˆ = 1↔
m∑
i=1
ai >= 0, yˆ = −1↔
m∑
i=1
ai < 0.
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The target is to bound Pr
(
yyˆ < 0
)
= Pr
(
y
m∑
i=1
ai < 0
)
. Note that for ∀i,
E
[
yai
]
= Pr
(
yai = 1
)−Pr (yai = −1) = 2θi−1. Then E[ m∑
i=1
yai
]
=
m∑
i=1
(2θi−
1). By assumption, E
[
ai
]
= θi, E
[
θi
]
= µ, then
Pr
(
y
m∑
i=1
ai < 0
)
= Pr
(
E
[
y
m∑
i=1
ai
]− y m∑
i=1
ai > E
[
y
m∑
i=1
ai
])
= Pr
( m∑
i=1
(2µ− 1− yai) > m(2µ− 1)
)
.
2µ− 1− yai is a zero mean random variable bounded in [−2, 2], with variance
E
[
(2µ− 1− yai)2
]
= E
[
(2µ− 1)2 − 2(2µ− 1)yai + (yai)2
]
= (2µ− 1)2 + E[(yai)2]− 2(2µ− 1)E[yai]
= (2µ− 1)2 + 1− 2(2µ− 1)(2θi − 1)).
1
m
m∑
i=1
[(2µ− 1)2 + 1− 2(2µ− 1)(2θi − 1)]→ 1− (2µ− 1)2 as m→∞, and
lim
µ→ 12
1−(2µ−1)2
2µ−1 =∞. Thus we use a lemma to bound the variance:
Lemma 4 ((Boucheron et al, 2013), Corollary 3.2) If
∑m
i=1 Xi has the
bounded difference property with constant c, then
Var(
m∑
i=1
Xi)
2 ≤ 1
4
m∑
i=1
c2.
From this we obtain that Var(
m∑
i=1
(2µ − 1 − yai)) ≤ m since the bounded
difference property with constant 2 holds. By equation 3,
Pr
(
yyˆ < 0
)
< exp(− m
2(2µ− 1)2/2
m∑
i=1
Var(2µ− 1− yai) + 2m(2µ− 1)/3
)
= exp(− m
2(2µ− 1)2/2
Var(
m∑
i=1
(2µ− 1− yai)) + 2m(2µ− 1)/3
)
≤ exp(− m(2µ− 1)
2/2
1 + 2(2µ− 1)/3).
Let δ = exp(− m(2µ−1)2/21+2(2µ−1)/3 ), solving for m gives the desired result. ⊓⊔
The main order term in equation 4 is 1(2µ−1)2 . Then we show another lemma,
which gives the cost bound for a quality ensured mechanism.
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Lemma 5 Let T > 1/2 be the ability threshold, and η = Pr
(
θ ≥ T ) be the
upper tail probability of the crowd ability distribution A. When the quality
ensured mechanism is employed, for majority voting aggregation under the
settings introduced in section 3, the aggregated label is correct with probability
at least 1− δ, if the total cost m′ satisfies
m′ ≥ 2(1− η) log
2
δ
η
+
4 log 2δ
(2T − 1)2η +
2
3η
. (5)
Proof The first step: For those workers whose confidence is larger than T ,
we bound the number of workers needed when the aggregated estimation is
incorrect with probability at most δ/2, which is denoted as m′0.
The target is to bound Pr
(
yyˆ < 0
)
= Pr
(
y
m′0∑
i=1
ai < 0
)
. Note that for
∀i, E[yai] = Pr (yai = 1) − Pr (yai = −1) = 2θi − 1 ≥ 2T − 1. Then
E
[ m′0∑
i=1
yai
] ≥ m′0(2T − 1). Then
Pr
(
y
m′0∑
i=1
ai < 0
)
= Pr
(
E
[
y
m′0∑
i=1
ai
]− y m
′
0∑
i=1
ai > E
[
y
m′0∑
i=1
ai
])
≤ Pr (E[y m
′
0∑
i=1
ai
]− y m
′
0∑
i=1
ai > m
′
0(2T − 1)
)
.
yai is an independent random variable in {−1, 1}, by equation 2,
Pr
(
yyˆ < 0
)
< exp(−m(2T − 1)2/2).
Let δ/2 = exp(−m′0(2T − 1)2/2), solving for m′0 gives
m′0 =
2 log(2/δ)
(2T − 1)2 . (6)
The second step: we bound the cost when sufficient number of workers have
confidence larger than T .
Consider the random variable I(θ > T ), the target is to bound Pr
( m′∑
i=1
I(θ >
T ) < m′0
)
. We have
Pr
( m′∑
i=1
I(θ > T ) < m′0
)
= Pr
(
E
[ m′∑
i=1
I(θ > T )
]− m
′∑
i=1
I(θ > T ) > E
[ m′∑
i=1
I(θ > T )
]−m′0).
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Since E
[
I(θ > T )
]
= Pr
(
θ > T
)
= η,E
[
I(θ > T )− E[I(θ > T )]]2 = η(1 − η),
by equation 3,
Pr
( m′∑
i=1
I(θ > T ) < m′0
)
< exp(− (m
′η −m′0)2/2
m′η(1 − η) + (m′η −m′0)/3
).
Let exp(− (m′η−m′0)2/2m′η(1−η)+(m′η−m′0)/3 ) = δ/2, we have
1
2
η2m′2 − [(1− η) log 2
δ
+m′0 +
1
3
]ηm′ +
1
2
m′0
2
+
1
3
m′0 log
2
δ
= 0,
then
m′ =
(1− η) log 2δ +m′0 + 13 +
√
[(1 − η) log 2δ +m′0 + 13 ]2 −m′02 − 23m′0 log 2δ
η
.
It is easy to see that m′ =
2((1−η) log 2
δ
+m′0+
1
3 )
η also satisfies the condition.
Together with equation 6, the desired result can be shown by union bound. ⊓⊔
The main order term in equation 5 is 1(2T−1)2η . Given the above two cost
bounds, we propose a more concrete definition on the effectiveness, based on
how much reduction on the main order of the cost:
Definition 2 Let µ be the mean of the crowd ability distribution, T be the
ability threshold for a quality ensured mechanism and η = Pr
(
θ ≥ T ) be the
probability for a worker to have the ability above T , then a quality ensured
mechanism is at least α-effective if
1
(2T − 1)2η ≤
1
(2µ− 1)α . (7)
When equation 7 is satisfied, by lemma 3 and lemma 5, the main order term
of the bound improves in the order of 12µ−1 , from 2 to α. α is a measure
of significance, as α decreases, the improvement on the cost becomes more
significant. We can also see that the ability threshold T should be larger than
the mean ability µ, i.e.
T > µ.
The reason is that from equation 7, it is not possible for a quality ensured
mechanism with T ≤ µ to be α-effective with α < 2, which means that the
mechanism can not lead to cost reduction. Now we are ready to show the
main result of this section, a general sufficient condition for a quality ensured
mechanism to be at least α-effective.
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Theorem 1 For crowd ability distribution with mean µ > 1/2 and variance
σ2 under the condition in equation 1, when
(1 + γ)
(1 +
√
1− 4σ2)2√
3σ2[2σ2 + (2µ− 1)]2 ≤
1
(2µ− 1)α , (8)
in which
γ =
Pr
(
θ ≤ µ− 12
√
1−√1− 4σ2)
Pr
(
θ ≥ µ+ 12
√
1−√1− 4σ2) , (9)
then the quality ensured mechanism with ability threshold
T = µ+
1
2
√
1−
√
1− 4σ2 (10)
is at least α-effective.
Proof First we show a lemma which gives a lower bound on the tail probability
for the crowd ability distribution. The intuition is that when the variance of
a random variable is high, the tail probability should not be too small.
Lemma 6 Given a random variable x ∼ A, x ∈ [0, 1] with mean µ and vari-
ance σ2, under the condition in equation 1, for 0 < r < σ, we have
Pr
(|x− µ| ≥ r) ≥ 2
√
3(σ2 − r2)
1− 4r2 .
Proof Suppose that
Pr
(|x− µ| > r) = A.
We can derive an upper bound of the variance σ2. Denote Y = |x − µ|, by
µ > 1/2 and equation 1, we have Y ∈ [0, 1/2]. Then
σ2 = E
[
(x − µ)2] = ∫ 12
0
y2dP (Y ≤ y) =
∫ 1
2
0
2yPr
(
Y > y
)
dy
=
∫ r
0
2yPr
(
Y > y
)
dy +
∫ 1
2
r
2yPr
(
Y > y
)
dy
≤
∫ r
0
2ydy +
√∫ 1
2
r
4y2dy
∫ 1
2
r
(Pr
(
Y > y
)
)2dy
≤
∫ r
0
2ydy +
√∫ 1
2
r
4y2dy
∫ 1
2
r
A2dy
≤ r2 +
√
[
1
6
− 4
3
r3](
1
2
− r)A2.
The first inequality is due to Pr
(
Y > y
) ≤ 1 and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
The second inequality is due to Pr
(
Y > y
) ≤ A when y > r. We then have
A ≥ 2
√
3(σ2 − r2)√
[1 − 8r3](1− 2r) .
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and
Pr
(|x− µ| ≥ r) ≥ Pr (|x− µ| > r) = A ≥ 2
√
3(σ2 − r2)√
[1 − 8r3](1 − 2r) .
Observe that
(1−8r3)(1−2r) = 1− ((2r)3 +2r)+ (2r)4 ≤ 1−2(2r)2+(2r)4 = (1− (2r)2)2.
Then
Pr
(|x− µ| ≥ r) ≥ 2
√
3(σ2 − r2)
1− 4r2 .
⊓⊔
Denote the ability threshold as T = µ+ r > µ, and assume that
Pr
(
θ ≤ µ− r) = γ Pr (θ ≥ µ+ r),
then
Pr
(
θ ≥ T ) = Pr (θ ≥ µ+ r) ≥ 1
1 + γ
√
3(σ2 − r2)
1− 4r2 . (11)
Now we turn to the task of finding the minimum of 1(2T−1)2η , which is equiv-
alent to maximizing (2T − 1)2η. Relaxation can be made to make use of the
lower bound given by equation 11. Then we turn to the maximization of
1
1 + γ
(
√
3)(σ2 − r2)
1− 4r2 (2µ+ 2r − 1)
2.
We have a constraint 0 < r < σ, and this constraint is enough to ensure
T = µ+ r ≥ 1. To see this, for random variable x in [0, 1] with mean µx > 1/2
and variance σ2x, the maximum of the variance is attained on the distribution
such that we have probabilities of 1/2 only at x = 1 and 2µ− 1. Then we can
verify that under this distribution, we have σ2x = (1 − µx)2 and µx + σx = 1.
By 0 < r < σ, we have (2σ+(2µ−1)2σ )2r ≤ 2r + 2µ − 1. We turn to the
maximization of
(4
√
3)(
1
1 + γ
)(
2σ + (2µ− 1)
2σ
)2
(σ2 − r2)
1− 4r2 r
2.
Let s = r2 and drop the constants for the moment. We consider
max
0<s<σ2
f(s) =
σ2s− s2
1− 4s .
We then have
f ′(s) =
(σ2 − 2s)(1− 4s) + 4(σ2s− s2)
(1− 4s)2 =
4s2 − 2s+ σ2
(1− 4s)2 .
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Without consideration of constraints on s, the optimal is attained when s =
(1−√1− 4σ2)/4. The solution satisfies the constraints since
1− 4σ2 ≤
√
1− 4σ2 ⇐⇒ σ2 ≥ (1−
√
1− 4σ2)/4.
So we have
T = µ+
1
2
√
1−
√
1− 4σ2
and
m′ = (1 + γ)
(1 +
√
1− 4σ2)2√
3σ2[2σ2 + (2µ− 1)]2 .
⊓⊔
From the theorem, it can be seen that as σ2 increases, the left hand side
of equation 8 decreases such that lower α can be achieved. In equation 9, the
smaller the γ is, the larger the upper tail probability at T can be ensured. It
is reasonable to assume that for an effective quality ensured mechanism, γ can
not be large, since Pr
(
θ ≥ T ) can not be small.
In equation 10, T increases as the variance gets larger. The intuition behind
is that when the variance of the crowd ability distribution increases, then we
have more workers with high ability, and we can safely increase T to make
higher demand on the quality of the returned labels.
5 Analysis on the Unsure Mechanisms
In this section, we consider the unsure mechanisms. In the previous analysis,
the quality ensured mechanisms guarantee that the abilities of the workers who
return their labels are above the threshold T . However, due to the potential
mismatch between one’s confidence and ability, an unsure mechanism does not
guarantee this property, since the workers behave based on their confidence,
not their true abilities. The only reasonable assumption we can make is that
there can be a positive correlation between the confidence and ability for an
individual worker. This makes it difficult to estimate the mean ability of the
crowd directly, which is essential for deriving the cost bound. In spite of this
diffculty, one of the major theoretical findings in this section is: If we can filter
out a bit more workers with low abilities besides the assumption in equation
1, then we can lower bound the mean ability. As a result, we introduce the
following worker testing stage conducted before the actual labeling tasks
start:
1. Keep a small pool of golden standard tasks with known labels.
2. For each worker in the crowd, k golden standard tasks are drawn for testing
the ability.
3. We only send tasks to workers who correctly labels all k golden standard
tasks.
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Note that we do not assume to have a sufficient number of golden standard
tasks to accurately estimate each workers’ abilities, or to make k large so that
the mean ability of workers can be boosted. On the opposite, we assume that
k is very small since by this it is enough to filter out a bit more low qual-
ity workers. The experimental results in section 8 show that introducing the
worker testing stage is effective even when k = 1. We assume that no rewards
are paid during the test stage, since the workers tend to have the motivation
for passing the test. It is also essential to ensure that the workers behave the
same among the test and the real tasks. As we assume workers’ honesty in this
paper, this is not a problem. While in applications it is necessary to utilize
incentive compatible payment mechanism to ensure honesty, as discussed in
section 6.
The next task is to model the relationship between one’s ability and con-
fidence. First we introduce some notations, as listed in table 1.
Notation Meaning
passed The event that a worker passes the worker testing stage
A0 Crowd ability distribution before the worker testing stage
A1 Crowd ability distribution after the worker testing stage
C1 Crowd confidence distribution after the worker testing stage
Prθ,0(·),Prθ,1(·) Probability over A0, A1
Prc,1(·) Probability over C1
Eθ,0(·),Ec,1(·) Expectation over A0, C1
µθ,0, σ
2
θ,0
Mean and variance of A0
µc,1, σ
2
c,1 Mean and variance of C1
ηθ,0, ηθ,1 ηθ,0 = Prθ,0(θ ≥ T ), ηθ,1 = Prθ,1(θ ≥ T )
ηc,1 ηc,1 = Prc,1(c ≥ T )
Table 1 Some notations used in further analysis.
To follow the analysis process in section 4, we assume that{
T > µθ,0, ηc,1 ≥ ηθ,1,
T > µc,1, ηc,1 < ηθ,1.
(12)
Furthermore, we introduce the following assumptions:
When ηc,1 ≥ ηθ,1, there exists k0 > 0, for all T > µθ,0,
Pr
(
c ≥ T |θ ≥ T, passed)
ηc,1
≥
(
Eθ,0[θ
k]
)k0
(
1
ηθ,0
), (13)
(µθ,0)
k+1
(Eθ,0[θk])1−k0
≥ 1/2. (14)
When ηc,1 < ηθ,1, then there exsits k1 ≥ 0, for all T > µc,1,
Pr
(
c ≥ T |θ ≥ T, passed)
ηc,1
≥ (µc,1)k1( 1
ηc,1
), (15)
(µc,1)
k1+1 ≥ 1/2. (16)
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Ignoring the exponential terms, equation 13 and 15 imply that
Pr
(
c ≥ T |θ ≥ T, passed) ≥ ηc,1 = Pr (c ≥ T |passed).
This is a reasonable assumption, since for an unsure mechanism to be useful,
the positive correlation between confidence and ability is necessary. The task
dependent constants k0 and k1 control the magnitude of this positive corre-
lation. Since we have Eθ,0[θ
k] < 1 and µc,1 < 1, the larger k0 and k1 are,
the weaker the positive correlation becomes. While these two constants are
usually small since it is common for the confidence and the ability to be corre-
lated. Equation 14 and 16 are adopted for cost bound derivation, ensuring the
transformed threshold T ′ to be above 1/2 (See equation 18 and 19). Under
the above assumptions, we can get the following cost bound for an unsure
mechanism:
Lemma 7 Assume the conditions in equation (12-16) to hold. Employ the un-
sure mechanism with confidence threshold T and the worker testing stage with
k golden standard tasks. For majority voting aggregation under the settings
introduced in section 3, the aggregated label is correct with probability at least
1− δ if the cost satisfies
m′ ≥ 2(1− η) log
2
δ
η
+
8 log 2δ
(2T ′ − 1)2η +
2
3η
. (17)
When ηc,1 ≥ ηθ,1,
η =
( T k
Eθ,0[θk]
)
ηθ,0, T
′ =
( T k
(Eθ,0[θk])1−k0
)
T. (18)
When ηc,1 < ηθ,1,
η = ηc,1, T
′ = (µc,1)
k1T. (19)
Proof The key idea is to estimate two quantities for the crowd after the worker
testing stage. One is the proportion of the workers who have confidence above
T , i.e. ηc,1. When ηc,1 < ηθ,1, we directly use ηc,1. Otherwise when ηc,1 ≥ ηθ,1,
we should lower bound ηθ,1.
ηθ,1 =
ηθ,0 Pr
(
passed|θ ≥ T )
Prθ,0(passed)
.
It is easy to see that Pr
(
passed|θ ≥ T ) ≥ T k, and
Prθ,0(passed) = Eθ,0[passed|θ] = Eθ,0[θk].
So we have
ηθ,1 ≥ ( T
k
Eθ,0[θk]
)ηθ,0.
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The other quantity to lower bound is the mean ability of workers who have
confidence above T , i.e. E
[
θ|c ≥ T, passed]. We have
E
[
θ|c ≥ T, passed] ≥ T Pr (θ ≥ T |c ≥ T, passed)
and
Pr
(
θ ≥ T |c ≥ T, passed) = ηθ,1 Pr
(
c ≥ T |θ ≥ T, passed)
ηc,1
.
Then by equation 13 and 15, we have the desired result. The remaining part
of the proof is similar to lemma 5. ⊓⊔
Denote B1 =
Tk
(Eθ,0[θk])1−k0
, B2 =
Tk
Eθ,0[θk]
, the main order term of cost under
an unsure mechanism is 1(2B1T−1)2B2ηθ,0 when ηc,1 ≥ ηθ,1 and
1
(2(µc,1)k1T−1)2ηc,1
when ηc,1 < ηθ,1. As previously discussed, k is usually a small number. Then
B1, B2 scale like constant factors. Thus we can let B1 =
(µθ,0)
k
(Eθ,0[θk])1−k0
to con-
sider the worst case, and ignore B2. Similar to definition 2, we define the
α-effectiveness for the unsure mechanisms:
Definition 3 The unsure mechanism with confidence threshold T , utilizing
the worker testing stage with k golden standard tasks, is at least α-effective
if 

1
(2
(µθ,0)
k
(Eθ,0[θ
k ])1−k0
T−1)2ηθ,0
≤ 1(2µθ,1−1)α , ηc,1 ≥ ηθ,1,
1
(2(µc,1)k1T−1)2ηc,1
≤ 1(2µθ,1−1)α , ηc,1 < ηθ,1.
(20)
The α-effectiveness again measures the significance of the imporvement on the
cost bound, with respect to doing simple aggregation from the crowd after
the worker testing stage. Then we can show the condition when an unsure
mechanism can be α-effective, which is similar to theorem 1. The process of
the proof is also similar to theorem 1, thus is omitted.
Theorem 2 Assume the conditions in equation (1,12-16) to hold.
(1) When ηc,1 ≥ ηθ,1, let
m′ = (1 + γ)
(1 +
√
1− 4σ2θ,0)2√
3σ2θ,0[2B1σ
1
θ,0 + (2B1µθ,0 − 1)]2
, B1 =
(µθ,0)
k
(Eθ,0[θk])1−k0
, (21)
γ =
Prθ,0(θ ≤ µθ,0 − 12
√
1−
√
1− 4σ2θ,0)
Prθ,0(θ ≥ µθ,0 + 12
√
1−
√
1− 4σ2θ,0)
, (22)
and
T = µθ,0 +
1
2
√
1−
√
1− 4σ2θ,0. (23)
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(2) When ηc,1 < ηθ,1, let
m′ = (1 + γ)
(1 +
√
1− 4σ2c,1)2√
3σ2c,1[2µ
k1
c,1σ
2
c,1 + (2µ
k1+1
c,1 − 1)]2
, (24)
γ =
Prc,1(c ≤ µc,1 − 12
√
1−
√
1− 4σ2c,1)
Prc,1(c ≥ µc,1 + 12
√
1−
√
1− 4σ2c,1)
, (25)
and
T = µc,1 +
1
2
√
1−
√
1− 4σ2c,1. (26)
Then if
m′ ≤ 1
(2µθ,1 − 1)α , (27)
the unsure mechanism with confidence threshold T , utilizing the working testing
stage with k golden standard tasks, is at least α-effective.
6 Discussion on the Payment Strategy
In the above analysis, we assume that returning labels and choosing unsure op-
tion are equally paid. In many crowdsourcing applications, this payment strat-
egy may lead to the potential danger for causing workers to always choose the
unsure option without returning any labels. This phenomenon violates the as-
sumption that the workers are honest. Using alternative incentive compatible
payment method (Shah and Zhou, 2015) can be helpful to deal with this prob-
lem. As an example, the following payment method incentivizes the workers
to behave honestly, under the assumption that the workers aim to maximize
their payments:
(1) Choosing unsure option is paid for T , the value of the confidence threshold.
(2) Among the returned labels, the ones that accord with the aggregated label
are paid for 1, otherwise are paid for 0.
It is easy to show that this payment strategy is incentive compatible. If the
worker has confidence c > T , then the expected payment for returning the
label is also c, while the payment for choosing unsure option is T . Thus the
worker is desirable to return the label. If c < T the reason is similar for the
worker to choose unsure option. The analysis in previous sections is a good
approximation for this payment method. The reason is that, since T > 1/2,
and for an effective unsure mechanism, most of the returned labels should
agree with the aggregated label, thus assuming returning labels and choosing
unsure option are both paid for 1 does not sacrifice much tightness for the cost
bounds. Overall, it is interesting to study how the optimal incentive compati-
ble payment method and the unsure mechanism can be integrated for different
application scenarios. We leave this as future work.
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Algorithm 1 OLU (OnLine algorithm with Unsure option)
Input: crowd A, number of rounds N , confidence thresholds tk , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
Random initialize T1 ∈ {t1, t2, . . . , tK};
Initialize Nj = 0, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K};
for i = 1 to N do
Draw one worker and provide unsure option with Ti;
ri = (2Ti − 1)2I(ci ≥ Ti);
for k = 1 to K do
if tk == Ti then
Nk = Nk + 1;
rˆk =
1
Nk
(
(Nk − 1)rˆk + ri
)
;
end if
end for
n = argmaxk∈{1,2,...,K}(rˆk +
√
2 ln i
Nk
);
Ti+1 = tn;
end for
7 Online Algorithm with Unsure Option
The central task for applying an unsure mechanism is to determine the
confidence threshold T . According to the previous analysis, setting T can be
transfered to the problem of estimating the mean and variance of the crowd
ability distribution or the crowd confidence distribution. For the case that
we need to consider the crowd ability distribution, doing accurate estima-
tion requires a sufficient number of golden standard tasks with known labels.
However, this condition is difficult to be satisfied in practice. For solving this
problem, we propose an alternative online bandit based algorithm for setting
the confidence threshold T . Note that we still allow to use a small number of
golden standard tasks to perform the worker testing stage.
The task is to properly choose the confidence threshold T , which can
be treated as bandit arms. We can model the crowdsourcing process as the
following bandit game: To collect a new label, a random worker is drawn
from the crowd, and a confidence threshold T is provided. T is updated
online by the bandit algorithm. We consider only discrete candidate set of
tj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, which segments the interval [0.5, 1] into finite number of
parts. Motivated by the previous analysis, we define the reward as
ri = (2Ti − 1)2I(ci ≥ Ti), (28)
in which i denotes the ith round, Ti denotes the chosen confidence threshold,
and I(ci ≥ T ) denotes the indicator function of the event that the worker
does not choose the unsure option. Under this definition, for each arm tk, let
Nk denote the number of times the arm is chosen. The average reward rˆk =
1
Nk
∑Nk
n=1(2tk − 1)2I(ci ≥ tk) is the empirical estimation of (2tk − 1)2 Pr
(
ci ≥
tk
)
, i.e., the inverse of main order term of cost for accurate estimation, which
should be maximized. ri are i.i.d. random variables bounded in [0, 1]. The
above problem can be solved by many bandit optimization methods, such as
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Fig. 1 Experimental results. In the legend, “Theory” denotes the result from setting the
confidence threshold as equation 25. “OLU” denotes the results from online unsure mecha-
nism algorithm. “SA” denotes simple aggregation without unsure mechanism.
the UCB-1 algorithm (Auer et al, 2002), which is illustrated in algorithm 1.
Note that more sophisticated bandit algorithm can be designed in this task,
since the sample collected on one arm may provide additional information on
other arms. As the major topic in this paper is theoretical analsys other than
algorithm design, we leave this as future work.
8 Experiments
We used synthetic data to test the theoretical results and the online algo-
rithm. In the experiments, a set of binary labeling tasks were generated, and
the ground-truth labels were uniformly sampled from {−1, 1}. To simulate on
different types of crowd ability distributions, the abilities of the workers were
sampled from different Beta distributions. The choices of distribution param-
eters {α, β} were {0.55, 0.5}, {1.1, 1} and {2.2, 2}. The corresponding mean
was 0.52 and corresponding variances were 0.1217, 0.0805 and 0.0480. Since
the mean is close to 1/2, the left hand side of the distributions were not cut
according to equation 1. The returned labels were sampled from the Bernoulli
distributions according to the abilities. To simulate the situation that the con-
fidence can be largely deviated from the ability, we assumed that the unsure
option was used when the sampled ability is above T or below 1− T .
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For each task, we collected the same number of returned labels for major-
ity voting aggregation. The baseline method was simple aggregation without
using the unsure mechanism. For examining theory, we adopted the unsure
mechanism, on which the confidence threshold is set according to equation 23.
To implement the online algorithm, we employed the candidate threshold set
{0.55, 0.60, . . . , 1}. For the fairness of the comparison, we adopted the worker
testing stage with k = 1 for all methods.
The results are illustrated in Figure 1. In all kinds of crowd ability distribu-
tions, employing unsure mechanism outperformed simple aggregation. As the
variance got larger, the number of workers needed for high accuracy aggre-
gation was significantly reduced. Furthermore, when the number of tasks got
larger, the performance of the online algorithm got better. This phenomenon
indicates that the online algorithm is capable to be employed when the number
of tasks to be done is large.
9 Conclusions
In this work, we theoretically study the cost-saving effect of the crowdsourcing
with unsure option setting. We give the sufficient condition for an unsure mech-
nanism can lead to significant cost reduction, show how confidence threshhold
can be properly set. Motivated by the theoretical analysis, we also propose an
alternative online algorithm for setting the confidence threshold. We also hope
our work to be a motivation for further studies on how crowdsourcing can be
helped by utilizing subjective uncertainty of workers.
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